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Recently, location privacy during the use of location-based services (LBSs) has raised considerable con-
cerns. There is a wide literature on location privacy from the individual point of view; however, there
exist only a few works to support location privacy for a group of users. In this paper, we consider location
privacy issues for a group of users who may ask an LBS for a meeting place that minimizes their aggregate
distance. The proposed solution, which we call the Group Location Privacy (GLP) protocol, is based on the
Anonymous Veto network (AV-net) and homomorphic encryption. It preserves the location privacy of all
users even in the case of collusion. Our solution also tries to minimize the LBS overhead for nearest neigh-
bor (NN) queries and communication, i.e., to decrease the number of NN queries sent to an LBS and the
number of points of interest (POIs) it returns. Furthermore, GLP greatly decreases the bandwidth usage to
a high extent and protects the LBS provider from excessive disclosure of POIs. We discuss the perfor-
mance and security analysis of the GLP protocol and show that the proposed protocol is secure against
partial collusion in a malicious model.
 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
With location-based services (LBSs), mobile users are able to
ask location-dependent queries and receive the desired informa-
tion based on their location at any time and from anywhere [1].
For example, a user can ask ‘‘Where is the nearest restaurant to
my location?’’ or a group of users can ask ‘‘Where is the nearest
meeting place that minimizes our aggregate distances?’’ [2].
To beneﬁt from these services, a user must reveal her exact
location to the LBS, but this jeopardizes her location privacy [3].
Knowing a user’s location could reveal sensitive private informa-
tion such as her health status, ﬁnancial status, future activity and
political afﬁliations. Several techniques have been proposed to pre-
serve user location privacy during the use of LBSs [4,5], but most of
them solely preserve the location privacy of an individual user [4]
and do not provide location privacy for a group of users. In this
paper, we consider the location privacy problem for a group of
users and propose a resource-aware technique to solve it.
We believe that the group location privacy problem is some-
what different from the individual location privacy problem. In
particular, there are various privacy issues in the group location
privacy problem. As an example, consider a scenario in which a
group of users (a working group) needs to urgently meet. Theyll rights reserved.
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raani-Dastjerdi), selcuk@cs.can use an LBS provider to ﬁnd the nearest meeting place that min-
imizes their aggregate distances [6]. To get the desired result, each
user sends a nearest neighbor (NN) query along with her location
to the LBS. The LBS evaluates the set of NN queries (a group of
NN queries or an aggregate NN query [6]) and retrieves the points
of interest (POIs) with the smallest aggregate distances from them.
Here, the aggregate distance is the total distance of all group mem-
bers from the meeting location [6].
We distinguish three major privacy issues in the group location
privacy scenario: (i) Preserving the location privacy of each group
member inside the group (this is called intragroup location privacy
throughout this paper), (ii) preserving the location privacy of each
group member from anyone outside the group, including the LBS
and outside attackers and (iii) preserving the location privacy of
the meeting place. The latter two issues together are called inter-
group location privacy. The third privacy issue on its own is needed
whenever group members want to have a secret meeting.
According to the above discussion, the focus of group location
privacy is on protecting the location privacy for all group members
(from users inside and from anyone outside the group) and also on
preserving meeting place location privacy (in the case of a secret
meeting); individual location privacy aims to protect one user’s
location privacy. For the above reasons, the techniques of the latter
cannot directly be applied to the former; special solutions need to
be developed.
In this paper, we aim to preserve the location privacy of all
members inside the group and from anyone outside the group.
We assume that our group does not intend to have a secret
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serving meeting location privacy, leaving the details for a future
work.
To the best of our knowledge, Hashem et al. [7] proposed the
ﬁrst solution for preserving group location privacy. In the ﬁrst
phase of this method, each user submits her imprecise location
to the LBS and the LBS returns a set of candidate answers with re-
spect to the set of received imprecise locations. In the next phase,
Hashem et al. propose a private ﬁltering algorithm that determines
the exact result from the answer set without violating members’
location privacy.
Although Hashem et al.’s work preserves the location privacy of
each user inside and outside the group, it suffers from a high com-
munication cost. It requires each user to send a distinct query (her
cloaked region) to the LBS and the LBS to send back a set of candi-
date answer points that contains the exact result (instead of only
sending back the exact result). Further, the set of candidate
answers must be reﬁned by the group members to determine the
exact answer, which imposes an additional communication cost.
In this paper, we propose a decentralized resource-aware proto-
col called Group Location Privacy (GLP) to protect location privacy
for a group of users while considering communication and compu-
tation costs. In GLP, instead of sending several messages, group
members collaboratively construct a single message that contains
one group location descriptor. This descriptor could be a minimum
bounding rectangle (MBR) that encloses all group members or it
could be the centroid point of all group members. Using the cen-
troid as the group location descriptor results in some interesting
properties. The ﬁrst one decreases the answer set size, because it
is enough for the LBS to return the nearest POI to the centroid in
the case of an NN query (or the k nearest POIs in the case of a k-
NN query). Secondly, there is no need to reﬁne the answer set be-
cause it only contains the exact result. Preserving the privacy of the
LBS content is the third property, since the LBS only discloses a sin-
gle POI in the case of an NN query (or a set of k POIs in the case of a
k-NN query); previous works may lead to excessive disclosure of
LBS content [2,3,7]. Because of these properties, we use the cen-
troid as the group location descriptor.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section
reviews related works in the ﬁeld of location privacy. Section 3 pre-
sents the proposed protocol. The security and efﬁciency analysis
are presented in Section 4. Section 5 compares the proposed proto-
col with the previous work and Section 6 concludes the paper.2. Related works
The works presented here preserve individual user location pri-
vacy based on the group formation idea; Chow et al. [8] were the
ﬁrst to propose a cloaking method based on this technique. In their
method, the mobile user forms a group of her peers by contacting
them via single-hop or multi-hop communication. Then, she blurs
her exact location into a cloaked region that encompasses the en-
tire group. The weakness of Chow’s method is that the mobile user
can learn the exact location of her peers.
PRIVE [9] and MOBIHIDE [10], based on the Hilbert Space Filling
Curve, assume that users trust their peers. In PRIVE, users are par-
titioned according to their Hilbert values and the cluster head is
responsible for location cloaking. In MOBIHIDE, the mobile user
constructs a hash table of other users’ locations and cloaks her
location by randomly selecting a number of consecutive entries
in the table.
Solanas et al. [11] propose a cryptography-based modular
method to preserve single-user location privacy. In a simple
scheme, a mobile user contacts her peers to learn their masked
locations. Then, the centroid point is computed by the user asher fake location. Since locations are masked by adding Gaussian
noise with zero mean, users can freely share their locations with-
out trusting their peers. But, if this procedure is applied several
times by static users, the user location will be disclosed due to
the cancellation of Gaussian noise [11]. As a solution, Solanas
et al. extend their scheme by applying a random chain and a pri-
vacy homomorphic encryption system, such that each user re-
ceives a value from her predecessor in the random chain and
then adds her encrypted masked location (with the LBS’s public
key) to it, then sends the result to another randomly selected peer.
This protocol protects user location privacy from the peers and
from the LBS. In Solanas et al.’s method, however, if the LBS eaves-
drops on the group’s internal communication, users’ noise-added
locations would be revealed in consecutive usages. This factor
may lead to reveling the actual location if the user is static, which
may or may not be a realistic scenario, depending on the
application.
Hu et al. propose a two-phase protocol [1] to preserve indi-
vidual user location privacy; they apply a group formation tech-
nique such that there is no need for users to trust their peers. In
the ﬁrst phase of their method, the mobile user identiﬁes her k
peers through proximity information; in the second phase, the
MBR of this set of users is constructed through a specialized
secure multiparty protocol. This approach is designed for
k-anonymity [1], so although it alleviates the need for peer trust-
ing, it constructs a large cloaked region; having a large cloaked
region increases the size of the answer set and communication
cost.
As explained in the previous section, Hashem et al.’s method [7]
is specially designed for a group location privacy scenario, thus, we
describe it here in more detail. The protocol consists of two phases.
In the ﬁrst phase, each user Ui registers with the coordinator and
gets a query ID (the coordinator is selected randomly before the
protocol starts). Then, each Ui blurs her exact location li based on
her neighbors’ imprecise location [12] and submits her cloaked
location Ri to the LBS. The coordinator sends a description of the
query to the LBS. After receiving all cloaked regions, the LBS re-
turns a set of candidate POIs A (that includes the meeting location)
to the coordinator, along with the aggregate maximum dmax(pj)
and minimum dmin(pj) distances of each pj 2 A from the cloaked
regions.
The second phase privately determines the exact POI through
sequentially updating the aggregate maximum and minimum dis-
tances of each POI in A with the users’ actual distances. This phase
can be conducted with or without a coordinator. In the ﬁrst case,
the coordinator sends the LBS result to a randomly selected mem-
ber Ui. The user Ui updates dmax(pj) and computes d
0
maxðpjÞ for each
pj 2 A by subtracting the value MaxDist(Ri,pj) and adding Dist(li,pj),
where MaxDist(Ri,pj) is the maximum distance between Ui’s
cloaked region and a POI pj 2 A, and Dist(li,pj) is the actual distance
of Ui’s exact location (li) from pj 2 A:d0maxðpjÞ ¼ dmaxðpjÞ MaxDistðRi;pjÞ þ Distðli;pjÞ:
After updating the answer set, Ui returns it to the coordinator.
Then, the coordinator chooses another member and repeats the
process until all members update the answer set; ﬁnally the coor-
dinator sends the actual result to all members.
In the second case (without the coordinator), the coordinator
sends the answer set with a list of unvisited users’ identities to a
randomly selected member. Then the selected user updates the an-
swer set according to the above equation and passes the updated
answer set to a randomly selected user among the unvisited users.
After the candidate answer set has been updated by all users, the
last user sends the exact result (a POI p 2 A with the minimum
aggregate distance) to all group users.
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of all members, it suffers from high computation and communica-
tion costs. The method requires the group to send n distinct nearest
neighbor queries and receive a set of candidate answers. Moreover,
the cloaking process requires additional communication and com-
putation costs. In particular, computing the imprecise location re-
quires each member to ﬁnd her k  1 neighbors and contact them
to collect their imprecise locations. Also, the LBS overhead to eval-
uate a group of NN queries is much higher than that of a single NN
query. Furthermore, the private ﬁltering algorithm in Hashem
et al.’s method imposes additional computation and communica-
tion costs. The protocol is also vulnerable to a partial collusion at-
tack: If the LBS colludes with the coordinator (in the ﬁrst scenario)
or with two users Ui1 and Ui+1 (in the second scenario), then all
members’ locations (in the ﬁrst scenario) or Ui ’s exact location
(in the second scenario) will be revealed. We described this attack
in more detail in Section 5.2.
In comparison, the GLP protocol preserves group location pri-
vacy in a secure and efﬁcient manner, with lower communication
and computation costs. It sends a single NN query instead of n NN
queries, and receives the smallest answer set: a single POI in the
case of an NN query. In addition, GLP does not need to apply a
private ﬁltering algorithm because it receives only a single POI.3. Protocol
In this section we describe the model of the proposed protocol;
the protocol itself is presented in Section 3.2.Fig. 1. GLP protocol.3.1. Model
The GLP protocol assumes a group of n users {U1,U2, . . . ,Un} hav-
ing wireless devices with location positioning modules, such as a
GPS. Users can establish Internet connections to external servers,
and point-to-point connections to neighboring devices. There is
an untrusted LBS provider who provides location-based services.
As the GLP protocol is based on a secure multiparty computa-
tion (SMC) [13,14], we assume an authenticated public channel
for each member of the group, which is a common assumption in
general secure multi-party computations [13,14]. This channel
can be realized using physical means or a public bulletin board
[15], where authentication can be done using digital signatures
[15]. To apply digital signatures, we assume users obtain their cer-
tiﬁcates at the time of registration in the system.
Regarding the threat model, GLP considers a malicious model
and allows the existence of active adversaries. Generally, there
are two types of threat models: (i) a semi-honest model and (ii)
a malicious model. In the semi-honest model, each participant fol-
lows the protocol speciﬁcation but tries to deduce some private
information about other participants; thus, only passive attackers
are allowed. In the malicious model, the adversary is active and
can behave arbitrarily.
Under the malicious model, GLP must satisfy three privacy
requirements:
1. Preserving intragroup location privacy.
2. Preserving the ﬁrst issue of intergroup location privacy.
3. Preserving privacy against active adversaries.
Intragroup location privacy protects users’ location privacy
from anyone inside the group; supporting this property prohibits
a malicious member (insider) from learning honest members’ loca-
tions. Protecting user location privacy from possible outside
attackers, including the LBS, is provided by the second privacy
issue above. The ﬁrst two privacy issues preserve user locationprivacy within the group and from anyone outside the group, while
the third privacy issue supports user location privacy in the case of
active adversaries who may collude to jeopardize user location pri-
vacy, i.e. the collusion of malicious member with or without an
LBS.
It is important to note that we consider Euclidean distance and
a 2D point database server [6] for the GLP protocol. Based on this
notation and the above model, we present the GLP protocol in
the next subsection.3.2. GLP protocol
The GLP protocol is based on computing a centroid as a group
location descriptor and minimizing the meeting point’s distance
from the centroid. Computing the centroid must be done in a se-
cure fashion, so that no information is revealed to any user except
the centroid coordinate. To achieve this goal, GLP applies two
building blocks: (i) a secure multiparty computation scheme [13]
and (ii) a homomorphic encryption system [16]. In the SMC proto-
col, group members jointly and securely compute a function of
their private inputs. Here, the private inputs are users’ locations
and the function outcome is the centroid coordinate. We use the
Anonymous Veto network (AV-net) [15] and Paillier encryption
[16] to design a secure centroid computation.
The AV-net protocol was developed by Hao et al. in 2006 to
solve the anonymous veto problem [17]. We adopt AV-net to hide
the exact locations of users during centroid computation. The ori-
ginal AV-net assumes a ﬁnite cyclic group G of prime order q, in
which the Decision Difﬁe-Hellman (DDH) problem is intractable
[18]. In this paper, we consider G to be a Paillier group (ZN2 ) in
which the Computational Difﬁe-Hellman (CDH) problem is intrac-
table [19]. The selection of the AV-net generator is important in
this group; it cannot be the same as the Paillier generator because
that generator (gs) is a special generator (gs = 1modN) that results
in solving the discrete logarithm problem (DLP), and consequently
the Difﬁe-Hellman assumption will not hold [19].
Hence, we select the AV-net generator (g) at random from group
of quadratic residue in ZN2 to hold the CDH assumption. All group
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tem and agree on g as the AV-net generator.
The GLP protocol has the following two phases as shown in
Fig. 1:
 Phase 1: AV-net values computation.
 Phase 2: Secure centroid computation.
The ﬁrst phase computes the AV-net values, which will later be
used as a mask to hide users’ exact locations. To compute the val-
ues, each participant Ui selects at random a secret value ai2RZN2
and broadcasts gai mod N2. After ﬁnishing this phase, each party
Ui computes gbi as follows:
gbi ¼
Yi1
j¼1
gaj
,Yn
j¼iþ1
gaj mod N2:
In the second phase, group members collaboratively compute
the centroid point (c) of their location through their corresponding
AV-net masks. Speciﬁcally, each member Ui except the group
representative Ua (a randomly chosen member to communicate
with the LBS) masks her location through the AV-net mask and
publishes (gxis gaibi ; g
yi
s gaibi ); Ua publishes the value (gxas g
aabarN1 ;
gyas gaaba rN2 ).
Note that Ua is a representative group member selected ran-
domly at the beginning of the protocol and can be different for
every usage of the protocol; it is not a predetermined user.
The user Ua performs the Paillier encryption, which, upon mul-
tiplying all values, results in encrypting the summations of the x
and y coordinates of all members (gRxis rN1 and g
Ryi
s rN2 Þ, as follows:
Y
all Ui but Ua
gxis g
aibi
0
@
1
Agxas gaaba rN1 ¼ rN1Y
i
gxis
Y
i
gaibi ¼ gRxis gRaibi rN1
¼ gRxis rN1 mod N2
and
Y
all Ui but Ua
gyis g
aibi
0
@
1
Agyas gaaba rN2 ¼ gRyis rN2 mod N2:
Since ai and bi are AV-net values, then
P
aibi ¼ 0 [15], and the re-
sults of the above equations are the summations of the x and y coor-
dinates, which are encrypted by the LBS public key in the Paillier
cryptosystem [16]. Finally, Ua sends a single NN query containing
the encrypted summation coordinates and the number of group
members (n) to the LBS.
Upon receiving the NN query, the LBS decrypts it using the pri-
vate key, applying Eq. (1).
DecðwÞ ¼ m ¼ Lðw
k mod N2Þ
Lðgks mod N2Þ
mod N; ð1Þ
where w is the ciphertext and m is the corresponding plaintext.
Then, the LBS divides the result by n to get the centroid coordinates
and executes a conventional NN query-processing algorithm to ob-
tain the point of interest with the smallest distance from the cen-
troid. The LBS sends the result back to Ua, who broadcasts it
within the group and the protocol terminates.
The GLP protocol uses zero knowledge proofs for security from
malicious participants and active adversaries. Each time a user
publishes a value to the bulletin board, she must provide its zero
knowledge proof. Thus, if there is any doubt about a member’s
honesty, members can verify the knowledge proofs and detect
the malicious member(s). For this purpose, we apply Schnorr’s sig-
nature [20] because it is a non-interactive zero knowledge proof; to
prove the knowledge of the exponent ai in gai , the prover sends{gv,r = v + aih}, where v 2 R Zq and h ¼ Hðg; gv ; gai ; iÞ. To verify this
proof, one can check whether gr is equal to gv  gaih.
In the GLP protocol, it sufﬁces to provide a knowledge proof
only for the last message of the users. Hence, each Ui but not Ua
goes through the following three steps:
1. Selects at random v ; v 0; v 00 2 ZN2 .
2. Computes h ¼ Hðg; t; gs; gv ; gv 0s tv ; gv
00
s t
v ; gxis gaibi ; g
yi
s gaibi ; iÞ where
t ¼ gbi .
3. Sends
ðgv ; tv  gv 0s ; tv  gv
00
s ; r ¼ v þ aih; r0 ¼ v 0 þ xih; r00 ¼ v 00 þ yihÞ.
Veriﬁcation of the proof can be done through the following
three checks:
1. gr9ðgai Þhgv
2. gr0s t
r9 gxis gaibi
 h
gv 0s t
v
3. gr00s t
r9 gyis gaibi
 h
gv
00
s t
v
The ﬁrst expression veriﬁes the knowledge proof of ai, while the
next two expressions verify the knowledge proofs of xi and yi,
respectively.
Ua publishes a different value, so her zero knowledge proof will
be different; she must demonstrate the knowledge proof of expo-
nents aa, xa and ya, and the N’th root of rN1 and r
N
2 . To do this, we
combine Schnorr’s signature [20] with Damgard and Jurik’s knowl-
edge of the N ’th power protocol [21]. In their protocol, to prove
that rN is an N ’th power, the prover sends {vN,z = vrh}, where
v2RZN2 and h ¼ HðN; rN;vNÞ. To verify this proof, one can check
whether zN is equal to vNrNh.
Providing zero knowledge proofs for values ai and ai2RZn2 ;Ua
does the following:
1. Selects at random v ;v 0;v 00;v1; v2 2 ZN2 .
2. Computes h ¼ H g;N; t; gs; gv 0s ; tvvN2 ; gxas gaaba rN1 ; gyas gaabarN2 ;a
 
where t ¼ gbi .
3. Sends ðgv ; gv 0s tvvN1 ; gv
00
s t
vvN2 ; r ¼ v þ aah; r0 ¼ v 0 þ xah; r00 ¼ v 00þ
yah; z1 ¼ v1rh1; z2 ¼ v2rh2Þ.
This proof can be veriﬁed by the following three checks:
1. gr9ðgaa Þhgv
2. gr0s t
rzN19 g
xa
s g
aabarN1
 h
gv 0s t
vvN1
3. gr00s t
rzN29 g
ya
s gaaba
 h
gv 00s t
vvN2
As before, the ﬁrst expression veriﬁes the knowledge proof of aa
and the second (third) expression veriﬁes the knowledge proof of
xa(ya) and the proof of the N ’th power of rN1 ðrN2 Þ. The GLP protocol
only requires a proof of knowledge for the second phase; as the
proof of exponent ai is already included, there is no need to provide
a separate proof for the ﬁrst phase.
4. Security and efﬁciency analysis
As mentioned in Section 3.1, the GLP protocol must satisfy three
security requirements:
1. Preserving intragroup location privacy
2. Preserving the ﬁrst issue of intergroup location privacy
3. Preserving privacy in the case of active adversaries
In this section, we ﬁrst analyze the protocol behavior against ac-
tive adversaries (third issue) and then in Section 4.2 we investigate
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Finally, we discuss the efﬁciency analysis of the protocol in
Section 4.3.
4.1. Resistance against active adversaries
A malicious member can try to cause a disruption attack, which
prevents the protocol from fulﬁlling its task. She can also try to
send fake values, i.e., she can modify her AV-net masks to prevent
the protocol from achieving its goal. Moreover, malicious parties
may collude to violate honest members’ privacy. We consider these
misbehaviors and analyze how the protocol can overcome them.
A disruption attack can be done by publishing a fake value or by
modifying the AV-net masks, i.e., a malicious member may use a
fake value of bi instead of the correct one as
P
aibi – 0. With our
use of the zero knowledge proof, no one can do this; the attackers
must know the discrete logarithm of the fake value to provide a va-
lid proof [15]. Even if the malicious party uses a known value such
as gci and publishes a zero knowledge proof for ci, the veriﬁcation
will fail because each party knows value gbi and uses that value
in the zero knowledge veriﬁcation. The attacker will thus be de-
tected during veriﬁcation and will be excluded; the protocol then
restarts.
In a collusion attack, active attackers may collude to discover
the location of a group member. There are two types of collusions:
(i) full collusion and (ii) partial collusion. In a full collusion attack,
all participants collude against one user; in a partial collusion some
participants, but not all, collude against one user.
In the case of full collusion on the GLP, the attackers are able to
remove the mask [15] and obtain the location coordinates. How-
ever, the GLP protocol is resistant against partial collusion. The pri-
vate value of each party in the GLP protocol is her location
coordinates (xi, yi). To reveal the location coordinate of Ui, the
attackers (or the LBS) must remove the AV-net mask from the mes-
sage ðgxi gaibi Þ. To remove the mask, the attackers need to learn bi,
but the AV-net protocol guarantees the secrecy of bi if partial col-
lusion occurs [15]. Since the colluding parties (including LBS) can
determine no information about bi, they fail to discover the loca-
tion coordinates of Ui.
4.2. Privacy properties
The GLP protocol has two privacy goals: (i) intragroup location
privacy and (ii) the ﬁrst issue of intergroup location privacy. Recall
that the intragroup location privacy supports user location privacy
inside the group; the ﬁrst issue of the intergroup location privacy
preserves user location privacy from anyone outside the group.
The proposed protocol preserves intragroup location privacy in a
partial collusion attack. As already mentioned, if a malicious mem-
ber tries to discover the location coordinate of another member,
she must cancel the AV-net mask, but with a partial collusion,
the attackers cannot obtain bi; consequently, intragroup location
privacy will be totally preserved. Moreover, due to the randomness
of the AV-net masks, the GLP protocol protects user location pri-
vacy in consecutive usages of the protocol with static users.
Regarding intergroup location privacy, GLP provides user loca-
tion privacy from anyone outside the group, including the LBS;
the LBS only learns the centroid coordinates. Moreover, even if
the LBS is able to eavesdrop on the group’s internal communica-
tion, it cannot obtain useful information about members’ locations.
Discovering the location coordinates requires the LBS to cancel the
AV-net masks, and as explained earlier, the LBS cannot obtain bi in
the case of a partial collusion. The situation is the same or even
harder for outside attackers, because in addition to not knowing
the AV-net values, they have no information about the LBS’s pri-
vate key.Further, the secrecy of the centroid coordinate is provided for
the GLP protocol because the outcome of the group computation
is the encryption of the centroid with the LBS public key. Therefore,
eavesdropping on internal communication by an outside attacker
would not reveal the centroid location.
Because the LBS returns the exact result of the NN query, the
LBS and possible outside attackers will learn the location of the
meeting place; hence, meeting place location privacy is not pro-
vided for GLP. To fulﬁll this need, one could use location cloaking
techniques [4]. In particular, before sending the query, Ua would
employ a location cloaking technique to cloak the centroid location
into a region and then send a single NN query along with the cen-
troid cloaked region. In this case, the service provider would not be
able to identify the exact location of the centroid and would thus
return a set of candidate answers without knowing the exact result
(the meeting place).4.3. Efﬁciency analysis
In terms of computation cost, we count the number of exponen-
tiation operations. The cost of multiplication operations is ignored
because they are negligible compared to the exponentiation cost.
In Phase 1 of GLP, each party performs a single exponentiation to
encrypt her random secret; this can be done ofﬂine. Computing
gbi incurs a negligible cost, as explained in [22]. In phase 2 of
GLP, each party must perform one exponentiation to compute
gaibi . The computation cost of gxis (and g
yi
s Þ is negligible, since the
exponent is a geographical coordinate, usually an integer between
six- or seven-decimal digits and at most 32 bits long. As a result,
based on the simultaneous multiple exponentiation algorithm
[23], the computation of gxas g
aaba rN1 requires one exponentiation,
and in total, GLP costs two exponentiations per user.
The GLP protocol uses a zero knowledge proof of the discrete
logarithms in the case of a dispute. We use an efﬁcient knowledge
proof [20] system to decrease the cost of the zero knowledge oper-
ations. It is important to note that any SMC protocol needs a zero
knowledge proof system to be secure against active adversaries
[15]; thus, its cost is unavoidable.
There are several factors that affect communication cost: the
number of intragroup messages exchanged, the number of queries
sent to the LBS and the size of the LBS result.
In each phase of the GLP protocol, each participant broadcasts
one message to the group containing a full-length integer; this re-
sults in each user sending two full-length integers in total. If we
count the total number of broadcasting messages, we get
n + n = 2n, where n is the number of participants. Thus, the number
of intragroup messages exchanged is of complexity O(n). Moreover,
the GLP protocol only sends a single NN query to the LBS and re-
ceives a minimal answer (a single POI) from the LBS. Thus, the total
communication complexity of the GLP is O(n).
It is worth mentioning that Ua, as the group representative, is
not a single point of failure because she is not a member with
any special capability, and every member in the group can act as
the group representative. Moreover, if Ua fails during a protocol
run, group members expel Ua and restart the protocol (choosing
another representative member randomly to communicate with
the LBS) without violating their privacy.5. Comparison
This section compares the GLP protocol with previous work. To
the best of our knowledge, Hashem et al. [7] have conducted the
only other work in the ﬁeld of group location privacy. We compare
GLP with Hashem et al.’s protocol and summarize the result in
Table 1.
Table 1
Comparison of GLP with Hashem et al. method.
Intragroup
privacy
Intergroup
privacy
Number of intragroup
messages
Number of sending
query points
Size of the
answer set
Resistance against partial
collusion attack
Hashem, 2010 Yes Yes O(nm) n O(l) No
GLP protocol Yes Yes O(n) 1 O(1) Yes
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collusion attack. We describe this attack below. Recall from Sec-
tion 2 that the second phase of Hashem et al.’s protocol can be con-
ducted through two scenarios: with or without the coordinator. In
the ﬁrst scenario, for each user Ui, the coordinator knows the value
of dmax(pj) before Ui updates it (we denote it as dmax (i)(pj)) and after
the update (we denote that as d0max
ðiÞðpjÞÞ, for each pj 2 A. In the sec-
ond scenario, without the coordinator, the immediate predecessor
and immediate successor of each user know these values. The LBS
knows the set of the users’ anonymous cloaked regions and the
maximum distance (MaxDist(Ri,pj)) of each cloaked region Ri from
each pj 2 A. Here we show that a collusion of the LBS and the coor-
dinator in the ﬁrst scenario reveals all members’ exact locations.
The colluding parties perform the following steps to ﬁnd the exact
location of a user Ui:
1. They choose a cloaked region R among the set of cloaked
regions, and assume it is Ui ’s cloaked region.
2. For each pj 2 A, the coordinator computes Dij ¼ dðiÞmaxðpjÞ
d0max
ðiÞðpjÞ and, with the help of the LBS who knows R, computes
dist(li, pj) =MaxDist(R,pj)  Dij.
3. For each pj 2 A, they draw a circle with center pj and radius
dist(li,pj).
4. If the circles drawn around pj for all pj 2 A do not intersect at a
single point in R, then R cannot be the actual cloaked region of
Ui. Otherwise, most probably it is the actual cloaked region of Ui,
and the intersection point is most probably the exact location of
Ui, given that there are a relatively large number of POIs
returned by the LBS. Hence, the actual cloaked region of Ui,
and consequently her exact location, can easily be determined.
Fig. 2 illustrates the attack for a typical user Ui and three POIs
when the attackers assign the right cloaked region to Ui.
This attack is also executable in the scenario without the coor-
dinator: A collusion of the LBS, Ui1 and Ui+1 reveals Ui ’s exact loca-
tion. In this scenario, for each user Ui,Ui1(Ui ’s predecessor) knows
the value of dðiÞmaxðpjÞ and Ui+1 (Ui ’s successor) knows the value of
d0max
ðiÞðpjÞ. Then, Ui1 and Ui+1 act as the coordinator in the above
mentioned attack, so with the help of the LBS, Ui ’s exact location
will be revealed.( )max 1,id R p1iΔ
Fig. 2. Illustration of a partial collusion attack with three POIs in Hashem et al.’s
protocol; thick lines show Dij.In a targeted attack, two colluding members can frame a partic-
ular user Ui: in this attack, colluding members can become the
immediate predecessor (Ui1) and immediate successor (Ui+1) of
Ui through tampering with the list of unvisited users. Speciﬁcally,
when one of the colluding parties receives the answer set and
the list of unvisited users, she can cheat by modifying the list of
unvisited users such that only Ui and her partner in the attack
(who will become Ui+1) remain unvisited and then she passes the
answer set to Ui. In this situation, Ui, not suspecting anything, for-
wards her updated answer set to the next attacker; the attackers
obtain the required knowledge and the attack takes place.
Based on the above discussion, we can say that Hashem et al.’s
protocol does not protect user location privacy in a partial collu-
sion attack.
Regarding the communication cost, the number of messages ex-
changed between peers in Hashem et al.’s protocol is of complexity
O(nm), where m is the number of response messages that have
been received by each participant from her peers.
It is important to note that in the ﬁrst phase of Hashem et al.’s
protocol [7], each user blurs her exact location based on her peers’
imprecise locations [12]. To achieve this, each user sends a request
to her peers and receives their imprecise locations; she then com-
putes her cloaked region as the MBR that includes her exact loca-
tion and her peers’ imprecise locations. Thus, the total number of
exchanged messages would be O(nm). In contrast, the GLP protocol
does not require users to compute their cloaked locations; users
privately compute the group location descriptor (centroid), which
needs O(n) messages to exchange.
The GLP protocol is resource-aware as it only sends a single NN
query to the LBS; Hashem et al.’s protocol sends n distinct queries.
As a result, not only the communication cost but also the LBS over-
head to evaluate the query is signiﬁcantly decreased in GLP. Specif-
ically, processing a group of NN queries requires the LBS to
evaluate each POI against a set of cloaked regions, which results
in increasing the overhead of the LBS.
The ﬁnal factor that affects the communication cost is the size
of the LBS result. In Hashem et al.’s protocol, the LBS returns a
set of candidate POIs along with the minimum and maximum
aggregate distances. Consequently, the size of the LBS result would
be O(l), versus O(1) in GLP, where l is the number of POIs in the set
of candidate POIs. Hence, considering each factor described above,
Hashem et al.’s protocol results in a higher communication cost
than GLP.
Having a small-sized result set protects the LBS from excessive
disclosure and supports LBS content privacy. The GLP protocol sup-
ports this property because it provides the minimum possible size
for the result set; a large number of POIs is disclosed in Hashem
et al.’s method.
In summary, the GLP protocol outperforms the previous work in
terms of efﬁciency and security. It preserves group location privacy
with a lower communication cost and a higher level of security in a
malicious model. It also prevents the disclosure of users’ locations
in a partial collusion attack.6. Conclusion
In this paper we have considered the problem of supporting
location privacy for a group of users who wants to beneﬁt from
M. Ashouri-Talouki et al. / Computer Communications 35 (2012) 1527–1533 1533an LBS and ﬁnd the nearest meeting place that minimizes their
aggregate distance. We have identiﬁed the privacy issues for this
group scenario and proposed a resource-aware solution – the
GLP protocol – to address them. The proposed protocol, which is
based on the AV-net protocol and homomorphic encryption, pro-
tects the location of all group members from an attacker inside
and outside the group. The GLP protocol decreases the number of
group queries and the size of the LBS result and also protects the
LBS from excessive disclosure of its content. The performance
and security analysis of the GLP protocol have been investigated
and it has been shown that GLP is secure against partial collusion
attacks in a malicious model.
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